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INTRODUCTION 
The patent law doctrine of equivalents, a judicially created 
doctrine of relief, allows a plaintiff to succeed in a patent 
infringement action even though the accused infringer has not 
literally infringed the plaintiff’s patent.1  In such a case, the court will 
find infringement if the defendant’s potentially infringing subject 
matter is equivalent to what the patentee claims.2  The doctrine 
effectively allows the patentee to broaden the patent claim beyond its 
literal scope to include subject matter that performs “substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result 
as the claimed subject matter.”3  This has the potential of broadening 
the patentee’s monopoly and the scope of protection beyond the 
initial intentions set forth in the patent application.4 
There are dangers, however, associated with the doctrine of 
equivalents—most notably, the uncertainty that the doctrine creates.5  
Generally speaking, courts should limit infringement to literal 
infringement when possible.6  Such a limitation is consistent with 
recent case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit,7 which has emphasized the need to narrow a 
 
 ∗ J.D. 2004, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S. 2000, Florida Atlantic 
University; B.E. 1993, Stevens Institute of Technology. 
 1 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853).  Winans is the first Supreme Court 
case shaping the doctrine of equivalents.  Id.  For a discussion of the establishment of 
the doctrine of equivalents, see infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text. 
 2 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1952). 
 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (2d ed. 1999). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614-18 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 6 See infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text. 
 7 The Federal Circuit is the appeals court for all patent cases.  Holmes Group v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002). 
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patentee’s rights in cases involving the doctrine of equivalents.8  This 
Comment proposes another mechanism which courts may utilize to 
narrow the rights of a patentee wishing to use the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Particularly, where the patentee has specific knowledge 
of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a reissue, the 
courts should not permit the patentee to appeal to the doctrine of 
equivalents 
In addition to being consistent with recent case law, one can also 
find support for limiting infringement to literal infringement in a 
long-standing principle of American jurisprudence—a person cannot 
appeal to equity when there is an adequate remedy at law.9  One 
might classify the doctrine of equivalents as a remedy in equity 
because a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
is similar to the equitable remedy of reformation (the jury is 
essentially rewriting the existing claims in order to find infringement 
in a particular instance).10  The Federal Circuit has classified the 
doctrine of equivalents as an “equitable remedy,” then at least by 
analogy, the doctrine of equivalents should not be available when a 
legal, statutory remedy is adequate and available.11 
This “inadequate remedy at law” rule has its roots in the English 
court system, which was principally divided into the law courts and 
the equity courts.12  Law courts were rigid in their rules and 
procedures, while the equity court was a separate court administered 
by the Chancellor that was more flexible, and focused on fairness.13  
While the writ system and technical pleading rules of the law courts 
compartmentalized disputes between parties, as they confined parties 
 
 8 See infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text. 
 9 Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 610 (E.D. La. 1999) (stating 
“[i]njunctive relief is an appeal to this Court’s equity jurisdiction. . . .  It is a 
fundamental teaching of equity that injunctive relief is unavailable when the party 
seeking relief has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if 
the requested equitable relief is denied”) (citations omitted); East River Sav. Bank v. 
Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 702 F. Supp. 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating 
“[p]laintiff does not dispute the general proposition that equitable relief is 
unavailable when there exists an adequate remedy at law.  Moreover, an equitable 
claim cannot proceed where the plaintiff has had and let pass an adequate 
alternative remedy at law”) (citations omitted). 
 10 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 11 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 92-1090, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22941, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 1992)  (stating “[b]ut the doctrine of 
equivalents is not an automatic second prong to every infringement charge.  It is an 
equitable remedy available only upon a suitable showing.”) (emphasis added). 
 12 LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 
12 (1997). 
 13 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12. 
  
2004 COMMENT 1301 
to specific enumerated causes of action in order to obtain relief, 
parties in equity petitioned the Chancellor to persuade him to relieve 
them from the injustice that would occur from a strict application of 
the remedies of common law.14  Equity thus grew to fill in the holes 
left by substantive common law and to make a broader range of 
remedies available.15  The remedy at law was typically damages; 
however, if the remedy sought was equitable (typically an injunction, 
specific performance, rescission, or reformation), a plaintiff generally 
had no choice but to bring the cause of action in equity court.16  The 
common law courts operated as a “brake.”17  A plaintiff had to appeal 
to the law courts first, as the courts developed a jurisdictional rule: 
equity was only available when the remedy at law was unavailable or 
inadequate.18  This did not mean that courts of equity would only 
grant equitable relief.19  A court of equity could also award damages 
as relief provided a plaintiff established equity jurisdiction because 
the remedy sought at law was inadequate or unavailable.20 
Under current United States jurisprudence, the separate law and 
equity courts have largely merged.21  This merger, however, has 
produced a dilemma.22  The inadequate remedy at law rule separated 
the jurisdiction of the law and equity courts.23  This rule also 
controlled whether equitable remedies were available.24  When 
federal and state government legislatures merged the law and equity 
courts, the legislatures did not provide direction about which rules 
should control relief in equity.25  As a result, although a court that 
 
 14 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918 (1987). 
 15 Subrin, supra note 14, at 920. 
 16 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12.  Common law courts did occasionally 
grant equitable relief under the guise of “writ[s] of prohibition,” but equitable relief 
for the most part only came from the equity courts.  T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 679 (5th ed. 1956). 
 17 Subrin, supra note 14, at 920. 
 18 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 12-13. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (stating “[o]f course, the general rule is that if there is an adequate remedy at 
law, equitable relief is unavailable”) (citation omitted); Pageland 29 Ltd. P’ship v. 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 91-1858-LFO, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231, at *13 
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1993) (stating “[i]n addition, plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish 
the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  Absent such a showing, equitable relief is 
unavailable”) (citations omitted). 
 24 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12-13. 
 25 Id. at 13. 
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had both law and equity jurisdiction was now granting equitable 
remedies, it generally only granted an equitable remedy when a legal 
remedy was inadequate.26 
The Patent Act offers a patentee a specific legal remedy—the 
reissue.27  Using this available legal remedy, a patentee can obtain a 
reissue patent to expand the scope of his patent claims.28  This allows 
the patentee to broaden his protection without relying on the court, 
as long as he complies with the conditions of his available legal 
remedy.29  The doctrine of equivalents is therefore an available 
judicially created remedy even when there is a remedy at law, and 
many patent attorneys representing defendants have asked for its 
elimination.30 
Rather than proposing a complete elimination of the doctrine of 
equivalents, this Comment proposes limiting the doctrine of 
equivalents in egregious cases.  Particularly, where the patentee has 
specific knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does 
not seek a reissue, the courts should not permit the patentee to 
appeal to the doctrine of equivalents.  Part I reviews the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Part II examines the Reissue Application and the 
statutory rights and requirements associated with it.  Part III 
compares these two remedies.  Part IV analyzes the trend toward a 
narrowing of rights.  Part V proposes restricting the doctrine of 
equivalents in egregious cases. 
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
There are two types of patent infringement: literal infringement 
or infringement by the doctrine of equivalents.31  In literal 
infringement, the invention “reads” on the patent claim.32  A patent 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).  A Reissue is an application filed for after the original 
patent issues.  Id.  The purpose of a reissue is to correct an inadvertent mistake, 
generally when the issued claims are too narrow or because the technology went in a 
direction where the patentee seeks broader claims.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde 
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).  The original 
application must support the new claims.  35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 
(1997). 
 31 Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 32 “Reads” on a patent claim means “all limitations of the claim are found in the 
reference, or ‘fully met’ by it.”  Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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claim defines the invention.33  It is analogous to a real property deed 
that defines the metes and bounds of an estate holder’s real 
property.34  In order to infringe a claim, an infringer must use every 
single word in the claim.35  Consider the following claim to a chair: 
A sitting device comprising: 
1. Four supports; and 
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four 
supports. 
A chair with four or more legs will literally infringe this claim because 
of the word “comprising,” a term of art, which means “including but 
not limited to” or “at least.”36  A stool with three legs, however, will 
not literally infringe this claim because three is not “at least” four.  
The patentee, therefore, cannot assert a literal infringement claim 
against a party using a sitting device with three legs.  One must 
determine what is truly the invention in this hypothetical.  The 
novelty of this arrangement can be either of the following: a specific 
amount of legs (four) connected to a horizontal member; or the fact 
that a horizontal member is connected to legs.  If it is the latter, and a 
competitor of the patentee sees the original claim to four legs and 
then designs a device using three legs in order to circumvent the 
claim, that competitor successfully avoids the patent claim but still 
“practices,” or uses, the invention.37  When a defendant’s invention, 
however, uses what is substantially the claimed invention, even 
though it is not literally infringing, the courts permit the patentee to 
sue under the doctrine of equivalents.38  In this instance, the doctrine 
of equivalents would allow the patentee to sue if the court finds that 
four is “equivalent” to three.39 
A. Establishment of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The first Supreme Court case shaping the doctrine of 
equivalents was Winans v. Denmead.40  The invention at issue in Winans 
involved railroad cars with circular rather than the traditional, 
 
 33 Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 34 See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 35 Cedarapids, Inc. ex rel. El-Jay Div. v. Nordberg, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1230, 1271 
(N.D. Iowa 1995). 
 36 Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 37 “Practicing” means using the invention.  Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
323 U.S. 386, 412 (1945). 
 38 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1952). 
 39 See id. 
 40 56 U.S. 330 (1853). 
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rectangular walls.41  The problem with the rectangular walls of the 
existing cars was that the stress on the walls caused them to break 
when filled with coal or other heavy items.42  The existing design 
allowed the railroad cars to transport a maximum weight in coal that 
equaled the weight of the car itself, while the patented design allowed 
the railroad cars to transport a maximum weight in coal of at least 
double that amount.43  Plaintiff’s circular wall design reduced the 
stress on the walls because the circular wall design supported the load 
in every direction.44  The defendants in Winans made railroad cars 
similar to those the plaintiff produced, with the following exception: 
the defendant used walls of an octagonal shape rather than a circular 
shape, to achieve similar stress reducing results.45  The question 
before the Court was whether the claims limited the patentee to 
circular inventions, or whether octagonal designs infringed as well.46  
The Court held for the patentee finding that octagonal was 
substantially similar, or “equivalent,” to circular in this circumstance.47 
The Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde 
Air Products Co.48 set out the modern contours of the doctrine of 
equivalents.49  The invention at issue in Graver Tank involved electric 
arc welding and specific fluxes, and of particular importance to the 
patentee was the ability to weld metal plates quickly with reliable 
strength.50  The alleged infringer used a flux that was substantially 
similar to that of the patentee, except that the alleged infringer used 
a silicate with manganese, which was not an “alkaline earth metal” as 
claimed by the patentee, rather than a silicate with magnesium.51  In 
Graver Tank, the majority held that courts may consider one an 
infringer if there is equivalence between elements of an accused 
device and elements of the claimed invention.52  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Jackson explained that for courts to allow someone 
 
 41 Id. at 339. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 331. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 340. 
 46 Winans, 56 U.S. at 339. 
 47 Id. at 344.  This Court rendered this verdict when patent applications used 
“central claiming,” and as such, a patentee is entitled to the invention in every form 
unless the patentee intended to disclaim such forms.  See id. at 342; infra text 
accompanying notes 81-85. 
 48 339 U.S. 605 (1952). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 610. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 612. 
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to imitate a patented invention while leaving out merely minute 
details would convert the protection the patent grant affords into “a 
hollow and useless thing.”53  Justice Jackson further noted that this 
kind of limitation would encourage an “unscrupulous copyist” to 
make insignificant changes to his otherwise copied subject matter to 
be take the copied subject matter outside the scope of the claims, and 
hence leaving the patentee with no recourse under the law,54 because 
a person seeking to copy an invention would normally introduce 
some minor alterations in order to conceal the piracy.55  The Court 
explained that without the doctrine of equivalents, it would have to 
determine infringement in patent law by rules of form rather than 
substance,56 and this would deprive a patentee of “the benefit of his 
invention and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of 
inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent 
system.”57  In this respect, the Court noted that the essence of the 
doctrine of equivalents is to prevent the defendant from practicing a 
fraud on the patent.58  As a result, when the defendant’s invention 
performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same 
way, producing substantially the same result, the court will find 
infringement.59 
 
 53 Id. at 607. 
 54 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.  But see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 
(1997) (finding that fraud on the patent is not the only reason to invoke the 
doctrine of equivalents).  Practicing a fraud on the patent means “making, using, or 
selling a device which meets the test of equivalence when compared to a patented 
invention but which avoids the claim language.”  Coleco Indus. Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n., 573 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 59 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.  In a more recent case, however, Warner-Jenkinson 
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997), the Court changed the wording 
of this equivalent infringement test.  The Court stated: 
In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important 
than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the 
accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to 
each claimed element of the patented invention?  Different linguistic 
frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on 
their particular facts.  A focus on individual elements and a special 
vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate 
completely any such elements should reduce considerably the 
imprecision of whatever language is used.  An analysis of the role 
played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will 
thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the 
function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the 
substitute element plays a role substantially different from the claimed 
element.  With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no 
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Courts designed the doctrine of equivalents to promote 
fairness.60  When courts invoke the doctrine of equivalents, they 
essentially reform the claims of an existing patent claim to cover an 
insubstantial change.61  The doctrine of equivalents is designed “to 
relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity requires, 
it is not designed to permit wholesale redrafting of a claim to cover 
non-equivalent devices.”62  Courts have realized that “[l]iteral 
adherence to the written claim in determining the scope of the 
protection can invite unfair subversion of a valuable right, which 
would substantially diminish the economic value of patents.”63  
Recently, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,64 the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that even a minor extension of 
protection beyond the literal wording of a patent may create 
substantial uncertainty about the point at which the patent monopoly 
ends.65  This uncertainty can hinder “a legitimate investment in 
technology-based products and services.”66 
B. Arguments against the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Many have argued that the doctrine of equivalents should not 
even exist for at least four reasons.  First, the doctrine is contrary to 
the second paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act.67  Second, 
Congress implicitly rejected the doctrine by using the word 
“equivalents” in the patent statute in another context.68  Third, courts 
originally created the doctrine when patent applications used central 
 
purpose in going further and micro-managing the Federal Circuit’s 
particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence.  We expect that the 
Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in 
the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such 
refinement to that court’s sound judgment in this area of its special 
expertise. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 60 DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 874 (2d ed. 2001). 
 61 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 62 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
 63 CHISUM, supra note 60, at 874. 
 64 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 65 Id. at 727. 
 66 CHISUM, supra note 60, at 874. 
 67 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1952) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 68 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1997) 
(discussing changes to 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (1994)). 
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claiming,69 a style of claiming that Congress overruled by statute.70  
Finally, a statutory remedy is available through the reissue.71 
Many, including Justice Black who dissented in Graver Tank, have 
argued that the doctrine of equivalents is contrary to the second 
paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act, which provides that “an 
applicant shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or 
discovery.”72  Justice Black reiterated that the patent statute 
specifically requires a claim, and that a claim precisely defines the 
invention and is something that a defendant infringes literally.73  
Justice Black explained “it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion 
of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import 
of its terms”. . . , and giving the “patentee the benefit of a grant that it 
did not precisely claim is no less ‘unjust to the public’ and no less an 
evasion of [the patent statute] merely because done in the name of 
the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’”74 
A second argument against the doctrine is that the patent statute 
uses the word “equivalents”75 in another context and thus Congress 
implicitly rejected the doctrine.76  The courts through case law, rather 
 
 69 An example of a central patent claim is as follows: “I claim as my invention a 
method substantially as shown and described in my patent application.”  See Winans 
v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853). 
 70 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27. 
 71 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 614-15 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing the predecessor statute to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 para. 2 (2000)). 
 73 Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 74 Id. 
 75 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2000). 
 76 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1997).  
The 1952 Patent Act in section 112, paragraph 6 contains a “means for” claming 
provision that incorporates the term “equivalents,” which is not contained in the 
1870 Patent Act.  Id.  Under the new provision, an applicant can claim his invention 
by the function it serves, instead of describing the element it uses (e.g., “a means of 
connecting Part A to Part B,” rather than “a two-penny nail”).  Id.  The decision in 
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946) prompted Congress to 
enact section 112, paragraph 6.  Id.  In that case, the Court rejected patent claims 
that do not particularly describe the invention but rather employ functional 
language.  Id.  Although section 112, paragraph 6 now allows “means for” claims, the 
patentee is not entitled to every conceivable “means” that will perform that function.  
Id. at 28.  Instead, the patentee is only entitled to those “means” disclosed in his 
specification, or “equivalents” thereof.  Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28.  The Court 
noted that “[t]his is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role, 
narrowing the application of broad literal claim elements.  We recognized this type 
of role for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank itself.”  Id.  Section 112, 
paragraph 6, however, “is silent on the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there 
is no literal infringement.”  Id.  The Court further explained: 
Because § 112, ¶ 6 was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem, 
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than Congress via statute, established the doctrine of equivalents.77  In 
1952, Congress revised the Patent Act and added the term 
“equivalents” with regard to a “means for” claim in the statute.78  At 
that time, Congress knew that the courts were using a word such as 
“equivalents,” but it did not include the doctrine of equivalents in the 
patent statute.79  Thus, some argue that because Congress used the 
word “equivalents” in other parts of the statute but remained silent 
about a “doctrine” of equivalents, that the doctrine should not exist.80 
A third argument against the doctrine of equivalents is that 
courts created it at a time when patent applications used “central 
claiming” as opposed to distinct claims, which the patent statute 
presently requires.81  A typical patent claim example during this time 
was “I claim as my invention an apparatus substantially as shown and 
described in my patent application.”82  A patentee was thus entitled to 
whatever he included in his disclosure to the Patent Office.83  This 
type of claim language was significantly less precise than, for 
example, the aforementioned patent claim to a chair: “A sitting 
device comprising: four supports; and a horizontal member 
perpendicularly connected to the four supports.”  In this example, 
regardless of the types of chairs the applicant discloses in his patent 
application, the current law limits his property right to specifically 
what he includes in the patent claims.84  Because the patent statute 
now requires distinct claims, as opposed to general “central claims,” 
 
and because the reference in that provision to “equivalents” appears to 
be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that 
cure, such limited congressional action should not be overread for 
negative implications.  Congress in 1952 could easily have responded to 
Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision.  But it did not.  Absent 
something more compelling than the dubious negative inference 
offered by petitioner, the lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents 
strongly supports adherence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that 
the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine.  Congress can legislate the 
doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses.  The various policy 
arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to 
Congress, not this Court. 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 77 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28. 
 78 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2000).  For further discussion of the history of this 
change, see supra note 76. 
 79 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28. 
 80 See id.  See also discussion supra note 76 for the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
this argument. 
 81 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27. 
 82 See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853). 
 83 See id. 
 84 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2000). 
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some argue that there is no longer a need for the doctrine of 
equivalents.85 
A fourth argument against the doctrine of equivalents is that 
Congress created a statutory remedy at law, the reissue, which should 
supplant the doctrine.86  In Graver Tank, Justice Black pointed out 
that the patentee has a remedy at law if the patent is wholly or partly 
inoperative as a result of inadvertent errors of the patentee.87  If the 
patent claims are too narrow as a result of an inadvertent error, the 
patentee is not without a legal remedy.88  The patentee can go back to 
the Patent Office, admit his mistake, and seek to broaden his claims 
with a reissue.89  Thus, if the claims are too narrow, there is a statutory 
method, not a judicially created method, to broaden the claims.90  If 
Congress declared via the Patent Act that a patentee can only 
broaden the claims within two years of the original patent grant, the 
courts should not then permit broadening under the doctrine of 
equivalents after this statutory time period has expired.91 
Although these arguments for eliminating the doctrine of 
equivalents may seem appealing, the courts should not eliminate the 
doctrine, but instead should limit its use in egregious cases.  The 
doctrine should not be available when the patentee has specific 
knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a 
reissue. 
 
 85 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27. 
 86 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 87 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615-16 (1952) 
(Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black explained: 
Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting 
conditions.  It also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with 
initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim was 
justified, and barred suits for retroactive infringement based on such 
expansion.  Like the Court’s opinion, this congressional plan 
adequately protects patentees from “fraud,” “piracy,” and “stealing.”  
Unlike the Court’s opinion, it also protects business men from 
retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a monopoly 
sphere beyond that which a patent expressly authorizes.  The plan is 
just, fair, and reasonable.  In effect it is nullified by this decision 
undercutting what the Court has heretofore recognized as wise 
safeguards.  One need not be a prophet to suggest that today’s 
rhapsody on the virtue of the “doctrine of equivalents” will . . . make 
enlargement of patent claims the “rule” rather than the “exception.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 88 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 89 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 90 See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 91 See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting).  According to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 251, a patentee has two years from the issue date of the patent to file for a reissue 
to broaden the original claims.  Id. 
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II.  THE REISSUE 
The reissue, a statutory remedy that Congress originally created 
in the 1870 Patent Act, permits the patentee to correct an inadvertent 
mistake that would render the patent “wholly or partly inoperative or 
invalid” after a patent issues.92  The patentee must have made the 
mistake “through error without any deceptive intention.”93  A 
patentee whose patent issues with claims that are not sufficiently 
broad is therefore not left without a remedy, as “inoperative or 
invalid” in the statute covers the situation where the claims of the 
patent are too narrow.94  Courts have held that a number of reasons 
will satisfy the requirement of a “mistake” for purposes of the statute, 
thus allowing the patentee to file a reissue application in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office to seek broader claims.95  These 
reasons include the following: the patent attorney drafted the 
application poorly, the attorney did not truly comprehend the 
essence of the invention, the technology progressed in a direction 
different than that which was anticipated by the patentee, or because 
of some other inadvertent reason the claims in the issued patent are 
simply too narrow.96 
A. Enablement in the context of a Reissue Patent 
The important policy concerning a reissue application is harm 
to the expectations of the public.97  A patentee seeking to broaden his 
patent claims via a reissue may harm these expectations because the 
public, including the patentee’s competitors, may have relied on the 
original claim language in shaping their commercial behavior.98  A 
patentee seeking a reissue must comply with the same relevant 
provisions of the Patent Act as an inventor seeking a non-reissue 
 
 92 Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 353 (1881); see also 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).  
When filing a reissue application, the patentee must surrender his original patent 
grant to the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).  
The reissue application, if it issues, will then issue with the prefix “RE” in front of the 
patent number.  37 C.F.R. § 1.173 (2004). 
 93 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 94 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 95 Id.  Of course, the original application must support these broader claims.  Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129 (acknowledging that “an inventor who attempts 
to broaden the scope of his claims through reissue may harm the public’s 
expectations, including competitors of the patentee, who have relied on the original 
claim language”). 
 98 Id. 
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patent.99  Thus, the reissue application must comply with sections 
101,100 102,101 103,102 and 112 of the Patent Act.103  The first paragraph 
of section 112 has three distinct requirements: written description, 
best mode, and enablement.104  The requirement of a written 
description assures the public that the inventor is in full possession of 
the invention prior to granting the patentee a monopoly on the 
invention.105  The inventor must disclose the best mode he 
contemplated at the time of the patent application filing.106 
Most relevant to the doctrine of equivalents is the enablement 
requirement.107  For an application to satisfy the enablement 
requirement, a person of ordinary skill in the art must be able to 
make and use the invention “as broadly as it is claimed”108 without 
“undue experimentation.”109  The purpose of the enablement 
requirement is to put the public on notice as to what the invention 
 
 99 Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 179 F. Supp. 95, 97 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 100 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that an invention must be useful to qualify for patent 
protection.  Id. 
 101 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides that an invention must be new to qualify for patent 
protection.  Id. 
 102 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that an invention must be nonobvious to qualify for 
patent protection.  Id. 
 103 Armstrong, 179 F. Supp. at 97.  35 U.S.C. § 112 provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and 
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
 104 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000). 
 105 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822).  Simply speculating on 
what arrangement might work to achieve the intended results is not sufficient.  See id. 
 106 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).  If the inventor contemplated a better mode, 
yet concealed it from the public, the patent is invalid.  See id. 
 107 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
 108 Nat’l Recovery Techs. Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys. Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 109 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The court stated: 
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would 
require undue experimentation . . . include (1) the quantity of 
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance 
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the 
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative 
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the 
art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
Id. 
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actually is.110  The broadest patent claim one can obtain in a reissue 
(or a non-reissue) is therefore “equal to the scope of the 
enablement.”111 
Any patent not enabled is invalid.112  Suits brought under the 
doctrine of equivalents, however, may have broadened patent claims 
that the patent specification does not enable.113  Consider once again 
the following claim to a chair: 
A sitting device comprising: 
1. Four supports; and 
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four 
supports. 
Assume also that the patent specification, drawings, and claims only 
disclose a chair with four supports.  Assume further that the patent 
specification makes no mention of having more than four or less than 
four supports, and that having less than four supports is not an 
obvious improvement.114  A competitor of the patentee may, seeing 
this patent, avoid literal infringement by designing and 
manufacturing a sitting device with three supports.115  Nowhere in the 
patent had the patentee disclosed a member with less than four 
supports.  The competitor could not have been on notice that a 
sitting device with three supports would infringe this patent.  Yet, the 
court could find infringement by the doctrine of equivalents if it 
found that three is equivalent to four, even though the patentee had 
never taught the public how to make and use a sitting device with 
three supports.  This defeats the purpose of section 112 of the Patent 
Act—which prevents this type of uncertainty that the doctrine of 
equivalents creates. 
B. Intervening Rights in context of a Reissue Patent 
When a patentee obtains a reissue, he must surrender the 
original patent to the United States Patent and Trademark Office.116  
 
 110 See Nat’l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1195-96. 
 111 Id. at 1196. 
 112 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 113 Case law is silent on whether the patent specification must enable an 
“equivalent” claim under the doctrine of equivalents.  See infra notes 147-50 and 
accompanying text. 
 114 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that nonobviousness is a condition for patentability.  
Id. 
 115 The competitor could not manufacture a sitting device with four or more legs 
because of the word “comprising.”  See discussion supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
 116 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
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Since the patentee surrenders the original patent, courts, at one 
point in history, acted as if it never even existed.117  This surrender of 
the original patent precluded an infringement cause of action for 
acts performed prior to the surrender because after the surrender, 
no patent existed.118  Further, courts would dismiss any suits filed 
before the surrender of the original patent for failure to state a claim 
on which relief could be granted.119 
To mitigate the harsh effect of the surrender, Congress 
responded to the courts’ treatment of the original surrendered 
patent by providing a form of continuity in certain circumstances if 
the claims of the original are carried over and “identical” in the 
reissue.120  The statute requires the claims be identical in order to 
relate back to the issue date of the original.121  Mere similarity 
between the claims in the reissue and the original is insufficient, as 
the original claims are “dead.”122  Liability for infringement of any 
new or amended claims in the reissue, therefore, commences only 
from the issue date of the reissue.123 
Congress has provided the patentee with a two-year window in 
which the patentee is allowed to broaden the original claims of the 
issued patent through the reissue process.124  Even with this two-year 
 
 117 Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 1 provides: 
The surrender of the original patent shall take effect upon the issue of 
the reissued patent, and every reissued patent shall have the same 
effect and operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter 
arising, as if the same had been originally granted in amended form, 
but in so far as the claims of the original and reissued patents are 
identical, such surrender shall not affect any action then pending nor 
abate any cause of action then existing, and the reissued patent, to the 
extent that its claims are identical with the original patent, shall 
constitute a continuation thereof and have effect continuously from 
the date of the original patent. 
Id. 
 121 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).  Consider an invention with three patent claims.  If the 
patentee is satisfied with the first claim, but decides the second and third claim are 
wholly or partly inoperative, he can surrender the patent and seek a reissue to 
broaden the scope of the second and third claims.  See Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 827.  
When the reissue patent issues, if a person were practicing an invention that was 
infringing the first claim when the original patent issued, the law will consider this 
person an infringer as of the day the original patent issued as long as the first claim 
in the reissue is identical to the first claim of the original patent.  See id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
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limitation, however, a reissue can unsettle a competitor’s 
expectations.125  The patentee’s competitor may have relied on the 
original claim language in shaping his commercial behavior and may 
have capitalized on subject matter disclosed, but not claimed in the 
original patent.126  During the first two years of the original patent 
term, the competitor may have made a significant investment “only to 
have the reissue lay claim to this previously unoccupied area.”127 
Congress responded to this problem by creating the doctrine of 
intervening rights,128 which guards against interference with a third 
party’s expectations.129  Under certain conditions, a reissue will not 
affect certain rights of those who practiced the invention prior to the 
issue date of the reissue.130  As a result of practicing the invention 
before the reissue was granted, “an infringer might enjoy a ‘personal 
intervening right’ to continue what would otherwise be infringing 
activity after reissue.”131  The rationale for the doctrine of intervening 
rights is that the public, including competitors of the patentee, 
obtains the right to use anything not claimed specifically in the 
original patent.132  Although in certain circumstances a patentee may 
recapture in a reissue subject matter dedicated to the public because 
he inadvertently failed to include it in the claims of the original 
 
 125 Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 827. 
 126 Id. 
 127 CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129. 
 128 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
 129 CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129. 
 130 Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985).  The court summarized 35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2 as follows: 
(1) No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or 
his successors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the 
grant of a reissue anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue 
the use of, or to sell to others to be used or sold, the specific thing so 
made, purchased or used, unless the making, using or selling of such 
thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the 
original patent. (2) The court before which such matter is in question 
may provide for the continued manufacture, use or sale of the thing 
made, purchased or used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or 
sale of which substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue, 
and it may also provide for the continued practice of any process 
patented by the reissue, practiced, or for the practice of which 
substantial preparation was made, prior to the grant of the reissue, to the 
extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the 
protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the 
reissue. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 131 Seattle Box Co., 756 F.2d at 1579. 
 132 Id. 
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patent, he may not do so at the “expense of innocent parties.”133  A 
court may therefore permit a competitor to continue to practice an 
invention claimed in a reissue if it determines that equity dictates this 
result.134 
When a reissue issues, it is presumed valid.135  It has “the same 
effect and operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes 
thereafter arising, as if the same had been originally granted in 
amended form.”136  Upon first glance, this language appears to 
prevent courts from protecting intervening rights.  The second 
paragraph of section 252 of the Patent Act, however, modifies this 
language to protect intervening rights.137  Further, when a defendant 
properly raises the doctrine of intervening rights, courts fashion a 
remedy using their broad equitable powers if circumstances 
warrant.138  Courts have discretion to fashion the remedy from “a wide 
range of options available” to them.139  If, however, the activity of the 
 
 133 Id.; see also Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat’l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 293 (1940) 
(allowing the defendant to continue to practice the invention that was later within 
the scope of the reissue claims where the defendant built and operated its 
equipment in a form that the original patent did not claim). 
 134 Seattle Box Co., 756 F.2d at 1579. 
 135 Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 829 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). 
 136 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
 137 35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2 provides: 
A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or 
that person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue, 
made, purchased, offered to sell, or used within the United States, or 
imported into the United States, anything patented by the reissued 
patent, to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be 
used, offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased, 
offered for sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued 
patent which was in the original patent. 
Id. 
 138 Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 830.  35 U.S.C § 252 para. 2 provides: 
The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the 
continued manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of the thing made, 
purchased, offered for sale, used, or imported as specified, or for the 
manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale in the United States of which 
substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue, and 
the court may also provide for the continued practice of any process 
patented by the reissue that is practiced, or for the practice of which 
substantial preparation was made, before the grant of the reissue, to 
the extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the 
protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the 
reissue. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 139 Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 830. 
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defendant infringes a claim of the reissue that is identical to a claim 
in the original, the defendant will find no protection under the 
doctrine of intervening rights.140  Consider once again the following 
claim to a chair: 
A sitting device comprising: 
1. Four supports; and 
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four 
supports. 
Assume that a competitor of the patentee was manufacturing a sitting 
device with three supports at the time this patent issues.  If the 
patentee seeks a reissue application to broaden his patent claim to 
cover a sitting device with three supports, even if he is successful in 
obtaining a reissue, the courts will allow the competitor of the 
patentee to continue to manufacture the sitting device with three 
supports because of the doctrine of intervening rights. 
III.  COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
EQUIVALENTS TO THE REISSUE 
The doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process coexist in 
patent law.  Just as there is “no fundamental inconsistency between 
equity and common law,”141 there is no fundamental inconsistency 
between the doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process.142  As 
such, “the availability of the reissue process [does] not vitiate the 
viability of the doctrine of equivalents for products that do not 
literally infringe a patent.”143  The patentee frequently uses both the 
doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process to broaden claims in 
order to capture subject matter not covered by the original claims.144  
The doctrine of equivalents, however, need not duplicate the patent 
statute’s method of correcting errors in claims.145 
A. Enablement in the context of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Whether or not a patent must enable an equivalent claim is not 
clear, as case law is silent on this matter.146  Wilson Sporting Goods v. 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 PLUCKNETT, supra note 16, at 679. 
 142 See Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Bremer, 958 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (N.D. Iowa 1997). 
 143 Id. at 1356 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 25-26 (1997)). 
 144 See Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 145 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (Rader, J, concurring). 
 146 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
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David Geoffrey & Associates147 prevents the doctrine of equivalents from 
expanding claim scope to embrace prior art.148  The “equivalent 
claims” therefore must comply with sections 102 and 103 of the 
Patent Act,149 but the court was silent on compliance with the 
enablement requirement of section 112.150 
The benefit to the patentee of circumventing the enablement 
requirement is that the patentee potentially can obtain broader 
coverage than he could have using the legal remedy of a reissue 
application, because a reissue must comply with the same relevant 
portions of the Patent Act as a non-reissue application.151  In an 
egregious case such as when the patentee had knowledge of the 
infringing activity and did not seek a reissue, the law should strictly 
confine the patentee to the claim scope he would be able to obtain by 
a reissue application. 
The entire purpose of section 112 of the Patent Act is to put the 
public on notice as to what the patentee is claiming as his 
invention.152  By permitting a suit under the doctrine of equivalents in 
a case where the patentee knows that literal infringement does not 
exist, the courts are allowing the patentee to circumvent the 
enablement requirement.153  This could lead to more unfairness than 
the injustice the doctrine of equivalents itself seeks to solve, as a 
patentee who did not draft claims as broadly as he should have, may 
in this instance make an assertion of infringement with “equivalent 
claims” that he did not enable.  The law should force a patentee in an 
egregious case to avail himself of his adequate legal remedy of the 
reissue, prior to permitting him to seek a judicially created remedy 
through the doctrine of equivalents.  Alternatively, courts should 
require equivalent claims under the doctrine of equivalents to meet 
the enablement requirement of section 112. 
B. Intervening Rights in the context of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Although Congress has granted certain statutory protections to 
an infringer of claims of a reissued patent that were not identical to 
claims in the original patent, no such statute exists to protect 
someone held liable as an infringer under the doctrine of 
 
 147 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 148 Id. at 683. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Case law is silent on compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112.  See id. at 684. 
 151 See Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 179 F. Supp. 95, 97 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 152 Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 153 See discussion infra note 164. 
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equivalents.154  In fact, if courts determine that one is infringing 
under the doctrine of equivalents, they are free to enjoin the 
infringer from practicing the invention at all, even though the 
infringer may have invested significant resources into practicing an 
invention he did not literally infringe.155  When a patentee knows that 
a potential non-literal infringer is relying on his patent and is shaping 
his commercial behavior around it, the law should force the patentee 
to broaden his claim through a reissue application.  Alternatively, the 
courts should provide for the same statutory intervening rights as 
those that are afforded an infringer of a reissue patent. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE TREND TOWARD NARROWING OF A PATENTEE’S 
RIGHTS 
The Federal Circuit has demonstrated a trend toward narrowing 
a patentee’s rights, primarily in applying remedies that are equitable 
in nature.156  First, the doctrine of equivalents may not be used to 
cover prior art.157  Second, the patentee cannot under the doctrine of 
equivalents obtain patent coverage to material disclosed in the patent 
specification but not claimed as his invention.158  Third, prosecution 
history estoppel159 applies to patent claims amended during the 
prosecution of the patent.160  Fourth, the defense of laches still 
applies to long delays in patent prosecution.161  Fifth, courts will 
construe patent claims narrowly when the claim language is 
ambiguous.162  This narrowing of rights is consistent with the 
 
 154 See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). 
 155 A court using its equitable powers would decide this, but the application could 
be inconsistent in the absence of a statute on point.  See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 
F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting possible inconsistencies in court 
construction of statutes absent congressional guidance). 
 156 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (Rader, J., concurring). 
 157 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 
(Fed. Cir. 1990).  A reference which would render a prospective invention as being 
not “new” is “prior art” under 35 U.S.C. § 102, while a reference which would render 
an invention as being “obvious” is “prior art” under  35 U.S.C. § 103.  See Wilson 
Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684. 
 158 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1054-55. 
 159 “Prosecution history” refers to the “public record of the patent proceedings,” 
such as the original as-filed patent application, correspondence to and from the 
Patent Office during the pendency of the application, and changes to the patent 
application during the proceedings.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727-28 (2002). 
 160 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). 
 161 Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 162 Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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proposition that, in an egregious case, when a patentee knows of the 
non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek his legal remedy 
of a reissue, the remedy under the doctrine of equivalents should be 
unavailable.163 
The first example of the narrowing of a patentee’s rights is that a 
patentee may not use the doctrine of equivalents to broaden claims 
to the point where the equivalent claims would cover prior art.164  In 
Wilson Sporting Goods,165 the court admitted that determining whether 
or not “prior art restricts the range of equivalents of what is literally 
claimed can be a difficult question to answer,” and that visualizing a 
hypothetical claim often helps conceptualize the “limitation on the 
scope of equivalents.”166  The real question is whether the Patent and 
Trademark Office would have originally allowed the claim when the 
patent issued in light of the prior art.167  If not, the patentee cannot 
broaden coverage under the doctrine of equivalents.168  If the Patent 
and Trademark Office would have allowed the claim, then courts may 
find infringement under the doctrine.169 
As the Wilson Sporting Goods Court suggested visualizing a 
hypothetical claim, consider again the hypothetical patent claim 
previously discussed: 
A sitting device comprising: 
1. Four supports; and 
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four 
supports. 
If at the time of this patentee’s filing, a sitting device with two 
supports existed in the public domain, the patentee will not be 
allowed to broaden his claim through the doctrine of equivalents (or 
a reissue) to include a claim to one support.170  In this instance, the 
patentee could only broaden his claim to read “three supports” 
because that is not excluded by the prior art.171 
Another example of the narrowing of rights is that, similar to a 
reissue application, a patentee through the doctrine of equivalents 
 
 163 See infra notes 164-204 and accompanying text. 
 164 Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.  This applies to 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 
U.S.C. § 103, which the court referred to as “prior art.”  Id.  The court was silent 
regarding 35 U.S.C. §112.  See id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See id. 
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may not obtain coverage of subject matter disclosed but not claimed 
as his invention after the patent issue.172  As early as 1881, in the case 
of a reissue, courts have treated subject matter disclosed but not 
claimed as in the public domain.173  This issue was unsettled until 
2002 in the case involving the doctrine of equivalents, where the 
court applied the same rule in Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Service 
Co.174  In Johnson & Johnston, the invention at issue involved metal foils 
used to manufacture printed circuit boards.175  The patentee disclosed 
in his specification that aluminum was the preferred material, but 
other metals such as stainless steel or nickel alloys were usable.176  The 
patentee, however, specifically limited the claims of the patent to “a 
sheet of aluminum” and “the aluminum sheet.”177  The court held, 
“[h]aving disclosed without claiming the steel substrates, Johnston 
cannot now invoke the doctrine of equivalents to extend its 
aluminum limitation to encompass steel.  Thus, Johnston cannot 
assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover the disclosed but 
unclaimed steel substrate.”178 
A further example of the narrowing of rights is that a patentee 
cannot recapture via the doctrine of equivalents any subject matter 
that he surrendered during the patent prosecution history.179  In a 
recent case, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,180 the 
 
 172 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  In the case of a reissue, a patentee can later claim subject matter he failed to 
claim provided it was inadvertent and meets the other criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 251.  Id. 
 173 Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1881).  The Court stated “the claim of a 
specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or 
combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public 
of that which is not claimed.”  Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
 174 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  The court noted: 
A patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed subject matter, 
however, is not left without remedy.  Within two years from the grant of 
the original patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and 
attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims to include the 
disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter.  35 U.S.C. § 251 
(2000).  In addition, a patentee can file a separate application claiming 
the disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (allowing 
filing as a continuation application if filed before all applications in the 
chain issue).  Notably, Johnston took advantage of the latter of the two 
options by filing two continuation applications that literally claim the 
relevant subject matter. 
Id. 
 175 Id. at 1048-49. 
 176 Id. at 1055. 
 177 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1055. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). 
 180 Id. 
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Supreme Court reiterated this principle.181  The invention at issue in 
Warner-Jenkinson involved a technique for purifying dyes.182  Because 
the patent examiner cited some prior art involving a pH greater than 
nine, the attorney for the patentee amended the claim to contain a 
pH of six to nine.183  The infringer used a chemical with a pH of 
five.184  The Court found no literal infringement because five was not 
within the claimed range of six to nine.185  Thus, the question before 
the Court was whether amending a claim barred the patentee from 
broadening that claim under the doctrine of equivalents.186  The 
Court held that the burden is on the patentee to establish the reason 
for amendment.187  Prosecution history estoppel will “bar” the use of 
the doctrine of equivalents for any amendment related to 
patentability, and only under special circumstances, can the 
presumption be rebutted.188  Although the Federal Circuit in a later 
case189 interpreted Warner-Jenkinson as an “absolute bar” to application 
of the doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court reconfirmed its 
“rebuttable presumption” holding of Warner-Jenkinson in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.190  This changed the “absolute 
bar” standard the Federal Circuit attempted to implement back to a 
“foreseeable bar” standard.191 
Consider the sitting device invention once again: 
 
 181 Id. at 33. 
 182 Id. at 21-22. 
 183 Id. at 22. 
 184 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 23. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 30-32. 
 187 Id. at 33. 
 188 Id. at 33-34.  In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
740-41 (2002), the Court summarized the circumstances where the presumption can 
be rebutted: 
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot 
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.  The 
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the 
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear 
no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; 
or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee 
could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question. 
Id. 
 189 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 190 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 191 Id. at 740-41. 
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A sitting device comprising: 
1. Two supports; and 
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the two 
supports. 
If the patent examiner cited prior art with two supports and the 
patentee then amended his claim to read “four supports,” that 
amendment would presumptively bar the patentee from using the 
doctrine of equivalents to obtain coverage for “three supports,” even 
if no prior art existed with three supports.192 
The Federal Circuit further narrowed a patentee’s rights in 
Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,193 where the patentee “sat” 
on those rights.194  In Lemelson, the patents at issue involved machine 
vision systems and identification technology and were allegedly 
entitled to a priority filing date195 of two patent applications filed in 
1954 and 1956, more than forty years before the filing of the suit.196  If 
the patentee established this priority date, nearly every bar code 
scanner used in the United States would infringe these patents.197  
The issue on appeal was whether the equitable doctrine of laches was 
a valid defense to infringement.198  The court held that laches was an 
available defense to “bar enforcement of patent claims that issued 
after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution even 
though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules.”199 
Another example of the trend toward the narrowing of a 
patentee’s rights occurred in Athletic Alternatives v. Prince 
Manufacturing,200 where the Federal Circuit applied a narrower 
meaning to an ambiguous term in a patent rather than a broader 
 
 192 See id. at 740. 
 193 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 194 Id.  “Sits on his rights” in this context is referring to a patentee who had 
knowledge of infringing activity but did not bring action early enough.  See id. at 
1363. 
 195 The priority filing date is the date a patent becomes prior art as against all 
other later inventions.  DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02 (2d ed. 1999). 
 196 Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363. 
 197 See id.  Prior to June 8, 1995, the term of a utility patent was 17 years from 
issuance.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).  Since these patents had not issued until 
approximately 1998, they were still valid despite the parent applications’ filing dates 
of 1954 and 1956.  See Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363.  Since applications were kept in 
secret until issued (now, until published), manufactures and users could not have 
known of the filed patents.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). 
 198 Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363. 
 199 Id. at 1363, 1366. 
 200 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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meaning.201  The invention at issue in Athletic Alternatives involved a 
method for stringing tennis racquets, and the court had to decide 
which interpretation of the phrase “varies between” to utilize in 
construing a claim against the defendant.202  The court reasoned that 
if it allowed Athletic to assert the broader meaning of “varies 
between,” the court would be undermining the “fair notice function 
of the requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject 
matter disclosed in the patent from which he can exclude others 
temporarily.”203  The court explained that “[w]here there is an equal 
choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and 
there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at 
least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider 
the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the 
narrower meaning.”204 
V.  PROPOSAL FOR RESTRICTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
The Federal Circuit has demonstrated a tendency to restrict the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents.205  Accordingly, even 
though the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s absolute 
bar standard of using the doctrine when the patentee has amended a 
patent claim to a foreseeable bar standard,206 the Federal Circuit has 
construed the Festo holding of the Supreme Court narrowly and 
continues to further restrict the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.207  The Federal Circuit should also restrict the doctrine of 
equivalents where a patentee with specific knowledge of defendant’s 
non-literal infringement willfully does not file a reissue.  In such an 
egregious case, the courts should not allow the patentee to appeal to 
the doctrine of equivalents because he already has a remedy at law. 
In Lemelson, the court found that the defense of laches was still 
applicable as a defense to patent enforcement in cases of the 
patentee’s unreasonable delay in prosecuting the application.208  
Likewise, if Congress changed the law so that seeking a broadening 
reissue, while available, was a prerequisite for filing suits under the 
doctrine of equivalents, the patentee who waits so that he falls outside 
 
 201 Id. at 1581. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text. 
 206 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 
(2002). 
 207 See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text. 
 208 Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1368. 
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of the two-year window for broadening claims via a reissue is also 
exhibiting unreasonable delay, and the courts should not permit him 
to appeal to the doctrine of equivalents.209 
Simply changing the two-year limitation on broadening patent 
claims will not solve the issue, although it could offer some 
assistance.210  Such a change, however, could create evidentiary 
problems.  By having the time limit for broadening claims exceed two 
years, the situation can arise where many “infringers” can contend 
they relied on the original patent claims in some instances fifteen 
years earlier to shape their behavior, and as such should be entitled 
to intervening rights.  This could easily become administratively 
infeasible, as courts could potentially have to adjudicate and grant 
intervening rights to many different infringers. 
 Finally, some may argue that the doctrine of equivalents is not 
an “equitable” remedy, but merely another legal remedy, albeit a 
judicially created one where courts construe the infringement statute 
broadly, and as such, the general rule of appealing to the law before 
equity should not apply.211  Under this argument, since a jury decides 
questions of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, rather 
than a judge as in an equity court, the doctrine is still a legal 
remedy.212  The argument continues: if the doctrine of equivalents is a 
legal remedy, a plaintiff should be entitled to select whichever legal 
remedy he seeks (i.e., sue under the doctrine of equivalents, or 
reissue and sue by literal infringement) just as he chooses his cause of 
action when filing his complaint. 
One can still classify the doctrine of equivalents as equitable, 
 
 209 See id. 
 210 The solution of removing the two-year limitation on broadening claims in a 
reissue was proposed by Martin J. Adelman and Gary L. Francione: 
The solution, however, is for Congress to repeal the two-year limitation and treat 
broadening and narrowing reissues alike.  The Federal Circuit has stated 
that “[t]he purpose of the law that a broadening reissue must be 
applied for within two years after patent grant is to set a limited time 
after which the public may rely on the scope of the claims of an issued 
patent.”  As long as the doctrine of intervening rights is enforced 
rigorously, however, the public will not be harmed by broadening 
reissues over the life of the patent.  Moreover, whatever greater 
uncertainty would result from liberalizing the reissue rules would be 
more than offset by a decrease in the uncertainty engendered by use of 
the doctrine of equivalents. 
Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine Of Equivalents In Patent Law: 
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 720 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
 211 35 U.S.C. § 271 is the patent infringement statute. 
 212 See Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (citing Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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however, even if the jury decides infringement under the doctrine.  
The jury had been deciding literal infringement, so allowing the jury 
to decide infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was a 
natural progression.213  Further, since infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents is analogous to reformation (the jury is 
essentially rewriting the existing claims in order to find infringement 
in a particular instance), the doctrine of equivalents is better 
characterized as an equitable remedy.214  Even if one cannot strictly 
classify the doctrine of equivalents as “equitable,” it may not be 
strictly “legal” because the Patent Act created a legal remedy – the 
reissue.215  Thus, by analogy, the doctrine falls within the general 
principle that one must avail himself of his available legal remedy 
first, before resorting to an extra legal remedy.  More importantly, 
the doctrine of equivalents is a dangerous doctrine and restrictions of 
its use are consistent with recent case law. 
CONCLUSION 
However the doctrine of equivalents is classified, whether merely 
“extra” legal or specifically as equitable, it has potential for being 
abused.  In the egregious case where the patentee has specific 
knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a 
reissue, as in Wilson Sporting Goods, Johnson & Johnston, Warner-
Jenkinson, Lemelson, and Athletic Alternatives, courts should further 
restrict the doctrine of equivalents to promote what it was intended 
to promote – fairness.216 
 
 
 213 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that the jury decides “disputed factual questions of what the patent 
covered”). 
 214 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 215 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 216 See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text. 
